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While the recent proliferation of sociological engagements with postcolonial thought 
is important and welcome, central to most critiques of Eurocentrism is a concern with 
the realm of epistemology, with how sociology comes to know its objects of study. 
Such a concern, however, risks perpetuating another form of Eurocentrism, one that is 
responsible for instituting the very distinction between epistemology and ontology, 
knowledge and reality. By developing a sustained engagement with Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos’s work, as well as establishing possible connections with what has been 
termed the ‘turn to ontology’ in anthropology, in this paper I argue that in order for 
sociology to become exposed to the deeply transformative potential of non-
Eurocentric thinking, it needs to cultivate a decolonial imagination in order to move 
beyond epistemology, and to recognise that there is no social and cognitive justice 
without existential justice, no politics of knowledge without a politics of reality. 
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 Over the past forty years, scholars in the humanities and the social sciences 
have provided powerful and sophisticated post-colonial and de-colonial critiques of 
the relationships between the conceptual, epistemological and methodological 
premises of Western modes of knowledge-production, and European projects of 
colonial expansion (for classical instances Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Bhabha, 1994; 
more recently, see Chakrabarty, 2000; Mignolo, 2011; Seth, 2013; Wallerstein, 1996). 
These critical lessons, however, have been rather hard-won in sociology1. Gurminder 
Bhambra (2007a) has argued that, due to the discipline's commitment to what are seen 
as the core values of modernity, the sociological engagement with postcolonial 
thought has been reduced to the rather liberal gesture of a pluralisation of ‘others’ –
both other sociological traditions and other ‘modernities’ (e.g. Eisenstadt, 2000)– 
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while remaining immune to the decentering and transformative challenges that such 
modes of thought pose to the core premises of sociological forms of understanding, 
explaining, and theorising. In the spirit of Bhambra’s call for sociology to become 
exposed to such challenges, this article argues that exposure to the difference that 
decolonial thought makes can not only transform how sociological knowledge is 
produced, but what we take sociology to be. 
 While Bhambra’s diagnosis is still largely descriptive of the contemporary 
relations between sociology and postcolonial thought, in the last few years the 
former’s immunity to the latter has also begun to show some signs of erosion. 
Sociologists of different parts of the world have been actively involved in mounting 
challenges to sociology’s Eurocentric premises by attempting to open up social 
theory’s canon (Connell, 2007), decolonising social research methodologies (Denzin 
et al., 2008), challenging sociology’s historical account of modernity (Bhambra 
2007b; 2014) and, centrally to all these projects, questioning the discipline’s 
epistemological presuppositions (Go, 2013, Keim et al. 2014; McLennan, 2006; 
Gutiérrez Rodríguez et al., 2010).  
 The question of epistemology, that is, of how European sociology –and the 
social sciences more generally– comes to know and represent its objects of study, has 
indeed been the common thread across the aforementioned projects and in many of the 
works of scholars in both postcolonial and decolonial traditions (see Savransky, 
2012). In this way, these projects have shown the necessary inadequacies, exclusions, 
and marginalisations that result of any attempt at producing knowledge of non-
European experiences by imposing sociology’s own epistemological categories, and 
they have argued for the need to develop alternative theories of knowledge that 
emanate from, and be grounded in, those experiences. 
 In this context, the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1992, 2007, 2008, 
2014), that provides a partial framework for this special issue and which constitutes 
the central focus of this article, is exemplary. Concerned for over two decades with the 
deep entanglements between struggles for social justice and forms of cognitive justice, 
he has developed not only a poignant critique of the ‘northern epistemologies’ 
associated with modern science but also proposed a plethora of concepts for the 
construction of an insurgent sociological imagination that affirms that ‘the 
understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world’ 
and thus seeks to cultivate an ‘ecology of knowledges’ (Santos, 2014: viii). In this 
way, he has become one of the leading voices in the articulation of a decolonial break 
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from the Eurocentric epistemology of the social sciences and has most recently sought 
to frame his project under the sign of ‘epistemologies of the South’ (Santos, 2014). 
 The emphasis on epistemology as the register par excellence on which to 
situate a politics of knowledge –an emphasis that, as said, runs across postcolonial and 
decolonial critiques within and outside sociology– is not, however, without its 
dangers. For although it may succeed in challenging the epistemological Eurocentrism 
that pervades modern European sociology and indeed the modern sciences as a whole, 
it still rests on the very modern, European image of thought that takes for granted the 
existence of a fundamental distinction, or what Santos (2014) calls an ‘abyssal line’, 
between epistemology and ontology, knowledge and reality. As I shall show, this 
abyss, which can be traced all the way back to Immanuel Kant’s ‘Copernican 
Revolution’, has shaped not only the modern sciences but also most of the Western 
philosophical imaginations on which both conventional and critical approaches to 
social science have been built.  
 I will argue that the reliance by postcolonial and decolonial thought on such a 
distinction risks producing another kind of Eurocentrism, namely, a metaphysical one 
(Savransky, 2014). Given this danger haunting the possible futures of a global 
sociology, the aim of this paper is to make a conceptual contribution to the insurgent 
sociological imagination that Santos’s (2014) calls ‘postabyssal thought’ by proposing 
that, in addition to the development of epistemologies of the South by way of an 
ecology of knowledges, what traversing the Western abyss requires is the cultivation 
of a decolonial imagination. One that may enable a global sociology to move beyond 
the very abyssal line that bifurcates knowledge from reality, or ‘epistemology’ from 
‘ontology’, and to reorient itself not just toward a decolonisation of knowledge, but 
also of reality. 
 After providing an in-depth exploration of the emergence and profundity of the 
colonial abyss and how it limits epistemological forms of critique, I will further clarify 
some of the implications of cultivating a different sociological imagination by paying 
attention to what has been called the “turn to ontology” in contemporary cultural 
anthropology (see for instance Alberti et al., 2011; Carrithers  et al. 2010; Holbraad, 
2012; Viveiros de Castro, 2003, 2014).  I shall suggest that, while this recent turn in 
anthropology is not without its limitations, a closer engagement between sociology 
and anthropology is imperative for the cultivation of a decolonial imagination. To the 
extent that the task of a post-abyssal sociology may be to learn from the social and 
political practices of subaltern countermovements of the global South in the struggle 
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for forms of social and cognitive justice (Santos 2014), a decolonial imagination can 
contribute to making sociology sensitive to the fact that at stake in many of such 
struggles is the constructive, political affirmation of ‘alter-ontologies’ (Papadopoulos, 
2010): of alternative –and often suppressed, silenced and marginalised– realities. In 
other words, a decolonial imagination involves the assertion that, to add to one of 
Santos’s (2014) guiding propositions, there is no social and no cognitive justice 
without existential justice. There is no politics of knowledge without a politics of 
reality. 
 If Santos’s work is exemplary, however, it is because it also points to a 
possible line of escape from the Kantian paradigm. Unlike what is apparent in the 
work of many scholars in postcolonial studies or indeed in the ‘coloniality/modernity’ 
programme, where epistemology is often seen as the ultimate horizon of any critical 
intervention worthy of its name (e.g. Quijano,  2007; Mignolo, 2011), I shall argue 
that within the vocabulary that Santos develops in order to devise alternatives to 
northern sociologies, one can already begin to envisage the seeds of a decolonial 
sociological imagination in the making. Thus, I will suggest that his concept of the 
‘sociology of absences’, if read in a radically realist sense, can become a potentially 
fertile, alternative locus from which to cultivate non-abyssal forms of sociological 
thought and knowledge. 
 
Down The Colonial Abyss: The End of Epistemology Without End? 
 
 Ever since his ‘Discourse on the Sciences’ (1992), the work of Santos has been 
concerned with the project of a reassessment of the processes by which Western, 
modern, scientific rationality has become associated with a universal virtue, while 
simultaneously turning every other form of rationality not just into cases of error but 
into the very definition of what that is ‘irrelevant, illusory, and false.’ (Santos, 1992: 
11). More than a scholarly interest in the history of scientific knowledge, Santos’s is 
an ethical and political project of taking seriously the critical question of what kinds of 
social, cultural and political life such forms of knowing have made available at a 
global scale, and at what cost. No response to such a question can be reduced to the 
demand for “better” modern science, for the contrast the question poses is a qualitative 
one. It is one that demands, first, the articulation of a critical stance regarding the very 
foundations on which modern, Western thought is built. Second, the reclaiming of old, 
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and the developing of new, modes of understanding (Santos 2008) for the construction 
of an entirely different kind of knowledge ‘that does not separate us from, but rather 
connects us personally with, whatever we study’ (Santos, 1992: 42).  
 One of the concepts that Santos has developed in order to critically diagnose 
the very nature of Western, modern thought is that of ‘the abyss’. According to this 
metaphor, Western thought is largely an abyssal form of thought, founded on ‘a 
system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of 
the visible ones.’ (Santos, 2014: 118). While the image of Western modern thinking as 
a binary thought that thrives in distinctions, classifications and taxonomies is well 
known, the abyssal lines that Santos rightly associates with it are even more 
foundational, such that whatever is forced to belong to ‘“the other side of the line” 
vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent.’ 
(Santos, 2014: 118). Unlike the modern habits of binary distinctions, such abyssal 
lines remain comparatively invisible, yet they constitute the very foundation on which 
Western binary thinking rests.  
 As Santos (2014: 119) explains, modern knowledge constitutes one of the 
spheres that is most conspicuously traversed by such lines.2 The visible abyssal line 
that pervades modern knowledge is at the core of disputes over the demarcation 
between scientific and non-scientific forms of knowledge. Concretely, it belongs to 
the distinction between modern science, with its ‘monopoly of the universal 
distinction between true and false’ on ‘this’ side of the line, and the knowledge 
produced by philosophy and theology, on the other. But such distinctions are only the 
more visible ones, operating within a Eurocentric academic system that, despite its 
constant threats to the institutional futures of philosophy and theology, already accepts 
them as legitimate –if not necessarily as ‘true’, or as ‘reliable’– forms of modern 
knowledge in the first place (Santos, 2014: 120).  
 As such, they themselves represent only one side of a more foundational, and 
less visible abyss. That is, the colonial abyss that separates Western, modern 
knowledges– some ‘truer’ than others, some more ‘rational’ and ‘reliable’ than 
others– on “this” side of the line, from the entire ‘realm of incomprehensible beliefs 
and behaviours that in no way can be considered knowledge, whether true or false’, on 
the other. These are practices constituted by non-modern, lay, peasant, and indigenous 
forms of thinking, knowing and feeling, that are ‘rendered incommensurable and 
incomprehensible for meeting neither the scientific methods of truth nor their 
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acknowledged contesters in the realm of philosophy and theology.’ (Santos, 2014: 
120)  
 The depth of the colonial abyss cannot be underestimated. For the abyssal 
image has not only infected conventional political and epistemological thinking in the 
West, but also its critical versions. Indeed, expanding considerably on a seminal 
observation by Aníbal Quijano (2007), Santos argues that because post-Marxist 
critical theory remains fundamentally anchored on a Western-based discourse of 
universal human rights, it ‘reduces the understanding of the world to the Western 
understanding of the world, thus ignoring […] decisive cultural and political 
experiences and initiatives in the countries of the global South.’ (Santos 2014: 21). 
Such abyssal ignorance situates contemporary critical discourses in something of a 
historico-theoretical paradox where, at a time when crises of diverse natures and scope 
proliferate, their critical political imagination has never been more ill-equipped to 
provide productive answers to the strong questions through which our global social 
and political futures are brought into existence. Questions, in other words, that amount 
to the demand to imagine, simultaneously, the end of capitalism and the end of 
colonialism; questions for which critical theory has nothing but weak answers (Santos 
2014: 24-27).  
 Although it is as difficult to imagine the end of capitalism and of colonialism 
as it is to imagine that they have no end–which is to say, that they are outside history– 
(Santos, 2014: 24) such imaginative impasses nevertheless seem to have a paralysing 
effect on critical thought. This paralysis is explained, according to Santos, by the 
Eurocentric epistemology informing Marxist and post-Marxist thought. Thus, while 
critical theory developed historically in the global North and is hence traversed by the 
colonial abyss, the most transformative left practices of recent times have been born in 
the global South, ‘carried out by strange people who often speak very strange 
noncolonial languages […] or less hegemonic colonial languages […] and their 
cultural and political references are non-Western’(Santos 2014: 41). 
 Given the colonial abyss’s pervasive capacity to infect the practices of critical 
sociological projects, Santos’s project of another knowledge for a different kind of 
social, cultural and political life, consists, consequently in a ‘rearguard’ theoretical 
construction that creates the conditions required to ‘capture the immense variety of 
critical discourses and practices and to valorise and maximize their transformative 
potential’ (Santos 2014: 42). Conditions that demand an ‘epistemological 
reconstruction’ (Santos 2014: 42) that would break with northern epistemologies 
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while ‘amplifying the intensity of this sound [i.e. the sound of the demands for social 
and cognitive justice by the anti-imperial global South] by exploring the different 
epistemological dimensions of the claims being made.’ (Santos 2014: 237). 
 While I strongly support Santos’s project of an engagement with 
epistemologies of the South, I would like to make a contribution to it by posing yet 
another strong, difficult question: what if the colonial abyss goes even deeper? Indeed, 
what if this epistemological line is not invisible enough, concealing its own 
foundation upon yet another abyssal line, just as modern, just as Western, which is the 
very distinction between epistemology and ontology, knowledge and reality? What if 
the left’s incapacity to listen and learn from the sound of demands of the anti-imperial 
global South is not only the result of an epistemological Eurocentrism that finds 
others’ forms of knowledge incomprehensible, but the result of a deeper, metaphysical 
Eurocentrism that opposes what these noncolonial languages assume, and does not 
understand that what is at stake is not only cognitive but existential justice– the cry 
that a different world is possible, and not just a different knowledge? 
 The conception of knowledge as actively representing reality, upon which the 
very importance of epistemology and its central question –what can one know?– are 
grounded, is in fact a quintessentially modern and Western conception. It is one that 
can be traced all the way back to Immanuel Kant’s (1998) so-called ‘Copernican 
Revolution’, where he attempted to reconcile the divide between empiricism and 
rationalism that through the eighteenth century governed the field of European 
philosophy by proposing the transcendental doctrine that the mind actively processes 
–represents– experience in constructing knowledge, instead of disclosing an 
independent reality. 
  In producing such a synthesis, however, a profound abyss had also been dug– 
an abyssal line situating any form of knowledge on “this side”, and any reality, on the 
other. For instead of disclosing eternal truths and the nature of God –as rationalists 
would have it– or indeed, of disclosing aspects of the reality of the world itself –as 
empiricists would have it– knowledge became the very correlation between the world 
and the experiencing human subject, between knower and known (Meillassoux, 2008). 
What we do know, therefore, became a matter of secondary importance in the face of 
the question of what we can know. It became secondary, that is, to the question of the 
transcendental conditions of possibility of knowing itself, while simultaneously 
entailing a ‘degradation of the world into ‘mere appearance’’ (Whitehead, 1978: 49); 
in other words, into how the world appears to the subject. In this way, there is nothing 
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that can be said of the world as such that is not said about the world as represented by 
human subjects. 
 As with the epistemological line described above, the impact of this other 
abyssal line on modern, Western imaginations can hardly be exaggerated. As 
historians of science Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007: 205) put it in their 
monumental study on the history of objectivity, Kant’s synthesis –which involved a 
reformulation of the scholastic categories of the objective and the subjective into the 
modern distinction we have come to take for granted3– ‘reverberated with seismic 
intensity in every domain of nineteenth-century intellectual life, from science to 
literature.’ Often marked by creative misappropriations and misreadings, echoes of 
Kant’s revolution provoked an enormous shift in the ethos of scientific research, from 
the metaphysical quest of truth, to the pursuit of objectivity as a distinctly 
epistemological goal that could guarantee that the inescapable activity of this knowing 
subject would not jeopardise the objective validity of scientific findings.  
 The formation of European sociological traditions was, for the most part, not 
exempt from the Kantian legacy either, often reappropriating Kant’s insights by way 
of Neo-Kantian conceptions that transposed the former’s transcendental conditions of 
the knowing subject into quasi-transcendental or historical, social, cultural and 
economic conditions. Briefly put, echoes of Kant resonate, for example, in Max 
Weber’s (1949: 81) classical definition of sociology as a science of interpretative 
understanding of human action, a definition whose basis was no other than ‘the 
transcendental presupposition of every cultural science’, namely, that humans are 
‘cultural beings’ that lend significance and assign meaning to an otherwise 
meaningless world. Durkheim (1965), for his part, swayed between a positivist 
inheritance that would enable him to assert social facts as ‘things’ and a neo-
Kantianism that asserted society as the ‘substratum’ of every form of individual and 
collective ‘representation’. And vestiges of the Kantian method emerge, albeit through 
a materialist inversion, with Marx’s and Engels’s (1998: 42) locating of historical 
modes of production as conditions for the development of social and cultural forms, 
including the formation of ‘consciousness’ and ‘ideology’. 
 More directly pertinent to our purposes, however, is the fact that the profundity 
of the metaphysical abyss created by Kant’s correlationist synthesis also stands at the 
core of the European traditions of critical thought – such as phenomenology, 
structuralism and poststructuralism– on which the epistemological critiques of modern 
scientific Eurocentrism often draw (see Braver, 2007). To be sure, postcolonial and 
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decolonial projects have contested the epistemological privilege accorded to modern 
forms of knowledge, thereby challenging the Eurocentric assumption that, unlike non-
modern thought —which often confuses nature with culture, humans with nonhumans, 
the subjective with the objective– Modernity provides the fully developed conditions 
for a form of knowledge that may count as universally “rational”. In so doing, 
however, they have also accepted the very same Kantian metaphysical framework for 
which epistemology becomes a distinct problem– namely, that any and all production 
of knowledge stems from individual or collective subjects that infuse what they see 
with their own conditioned presuppositions. 
 Indeed, to the extent that they criticise Eurocentric assumptions on the basis 
that they presuppose that the ‘knowing subjects [are] also universal’ (Mignolo, 2009: 
160) and that the exclusions they effect are ‘ultimately epistemological’ (Chakrabarty, 
2000: 98); in other words, to the extent that these criticisms assume that colonial 
oppression is exerted, ‘above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing 
knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, 
modes of signification over resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and 
objectivised expression, intellectual or visual’ (Quijano, 2007: 169. emphasis added), 
such criticisms cannot challenge the modern, Western epistemological privilege 
without simultaneously participating in the latter’s way of imagining what knowledge 
is in the first place, and how it connects, or fails to connect, with reality.   
 In the aforementioned article, Bhambra (2007: 879) suggests that a 
pluralisation of other voices in sociology ‘can never be enough’ to release the 
transformative potential of postcolonial thought unless their emergence calls into 
question ‘the structures of knowledge that have previously occluded’ them. In the 
same spirit, I am arguing here that pluralising other knowledges can never be enough 
unless their emergence calls into question the metaphysical structures of the 
imagination that keep the very relationship between epistemology and ontology intact. 
Otherwise, the attempts to traverse the epistemological abyss may be at risk of going 
down a deeper one. They are at risk, that is, of relying on a different kind of 
Eurocentrism that does not simply affect the structures and categories of knowing but 
the entire mode of imagining the relationship between knowledge and reality. One that 
enables a sociological engagement with knowledges from the South at the expense of 
a more radical engagement with the fact that there may well be no such distinction 
between the knowledges and the realities of the South (Savransky, 2014). 
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  Thus, if the epistemological Eurocentrism of critical theory demands that we 
assert that it is as difficult to imagine the end of capitalism and of colonialism as it is 
to imagine that they have no end, I propose here that the threat of metaphysical 
Eurocentrism haunting the traditions of postcolonial thought that extend the Kantian 
legacy also demands, in turn, that we assert that it is as difficult to imagine the end of 
epistemology as it is to imagine that it has no end. Put differently, it demands of us 
that we risk imagining an entirely different relationship between knowledge and 
reality.   
 In the remainder of this paper I thus seek to explore this demand, and to 
provide some initial elements for its development. In order to further clarify some of 
the implications of cultivating a different imagination for sociology, in what follows I 
shall first attend to the recent efforts by a number of cultural anthropologists that have 
been involved in a similar task of reshaping the anthropological imagination and, as a 
result, have called for a ‘turn to ontology’ in anthropology. I shall suggest that, while 
the framing of such a ‘turn’ is not without its own dangers, the possibilities made 
available by some of this work suggest that today, perhaps more than ever, new 
alliances between sociology and anthropology are called for. With a view to forging 
such alliances, in the final section of the article I shall return to Santos’s work to 
suggest that aspects of the latter already contain elements that may enable such a 
decolonial imagination to be cultivated, and stronger alliances to be forged, even as 
difficult questions are posed to it. 
 
A Permanent Decolonisation of Thought: Anthropology and The 
“Turn to Ontology” 
 
 While it may have been born as a direct product of colonialism, devoting its 
efforts ‘to a description and analysis– carried out by Europeans, for a European 
audience– of non-European societies dominated by European power’ (Asad, 1973: 
15), for the last four decades anthropology has been not only aware of its implication 
in colonialism, but actively and critically revisiting its own foundations as a 
consequence. Indeed, the landmark publication of Writing Culture (Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986), which represented a transformative event in the discipline that opened 
it up to a ‘reflexive turn’, was also motivated by the realisation that anthropology had 
been ‘enmeshed in a world of enduring and changing power inequalities, [in which] it 
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continues to be implicated.’ (Clifford, 1986: 9) Surely, the effects that such a turn has 
had on anthropology –and beyond– are in many ways welcome. The discussion above, 
however, should make us vigilant of the seamless convergence between the 
discipline’s increasing self-awareness as to its own colonialist underpinnings, and a 
crisis of representation that turned anthropologists attention to the epistemological 
premises by which knowledge of other cultures is produced. 
 Indeed, although it problematised anthropology’s conventional ways of 
mobilising its own modern, Western, truths to explain away the ‘beliefs’ of ‘primitive’ 
others, and forced it to turn its attention toward its own modes of representation and 
veridiction, the reflexive turn –perhaps we may call it the Kantian turn?– could not 
provincialise anthropology’s truths without simultaneously universalising its own 
epistemological problem. In other words, while anthropology could no longer be the 
discipline concerned with knowing the truth about human nature across cultures, it 
became a study of how cultures, peoples –including anthropologists, but also everyone 
else– interpret and represent the world. 
 Despite the overwhelming success of the reflexive turn, in recent years an 
alternative to anthropology’s epistemological obsessions, one that could be seen as 
emerging in the wake of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s pioneering ethnography of 
Amerindian perspectivism (1998), has begun to take the discipline by storm (e.g. 
Alberti et al., 2011; Carrithers  et al. 2010; Holbraad, 2012; Viveiros de Castro, 2003, 
2014). In many ways, this alternative, that has received the name of the ‘ontological 
turn’, shares with other decolonial projects such as Santos’s a similar aim. That is, that 
of turning anthropology into ‘a permanent exercise in the decolonisation of thought’ 
(Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 47-48) by attempting to learn from those others that 
Western thought has considered irrational or incomprehensible, and doing so in such a 
way that these others are configured as theoretical agents, as a source of the most 
interesting concepts, problems, and entities, rather than as mere cultural objects of 
Western thought and knowledge (Viveiros de Castro, 2004: 4, 2014: 40).  
 However, unlike the decolonial projects that extend the Kantian legacy –for 
which this exercise in ‘learning from’ often involves the paradox of reconstructing an 
epistemology for people who do not construct it for themselves4– this alternative is 
animated by a different kind of imagination. It seeks to take the thought of others –
which is also to say, the reality of others– seriously by ‘using it, drawing out its 
consequences, and asserting the effects it may produce on our own’ modern, Western 
thought (Viveiros de Castro, 2003). As such, it involves a ‘recursive’ (Holbraad, 
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2012), or what I would call a ‘speculative’ (Savransky, 2016), operation– rather than 
attempting to think about difference, it seeks to think with the difference that thinking 
from the South itself makes.  
 Thus, its task is no longer that of putting non-European realities and the 
thinking that is cultivated in and from them to the test of modern, Western, thought. 
Nor is it that of attempting to level the playing field by raising all concepts to the 
status of representations thereby forcing others to partake in the modern game of 
epistemology. Instead, such a decolonial, speculative project seeks to put modern, 
Western, thought to the test of non-modern, non-Western realities, and to experience 
the transformation of our Western imagination by the radical, decolonising differences 
other realities, other concepts, and other truths, make. 
  An illustrative example of this, which deals directly –if only seemingly– with 
questions of knowledge, can be found in Martin Holbraad’s (2012) ethnography of the 
concept of truth in Ifá practices of divination in Cuba, a concept that is not merely 
implicitly involved in divination but crucially present, both for practitioners and 
consultants, as something that matters (Savransky, 2016). The point of departure is the 
seeming paradox, from the point of view of the West, that ‘practitioners of divination 
do not just take the verdicts that oracles deliver to be true, but rather take them to be 
the kinds of things that could not but be true.’ (Holbraad, 2012: 55. emphasis in 
original). In this way, a ‘[d]iviner’s claim, in other words, is not just to truth, but 
rather to a kind of truth that has also been something of a holy grail in the Western 
tradition of reasoning, namely indubitable truth.’ (Holbraad, 2012: 55). 
 That divinatory truth be indubitable is important, and not just because it 
discloses the radical alterity of diviners’ claim in the eyes of a skeptical, secularist, 
Western anthropologist who may already have a hard time imagining that any 
relationship between something as dubious as divination, and something as solemn as 
truth, even exists. It is important because to speak of indubitable truth is, strictly 
speaking, to eschew the Kantian problem of epistemology altogether. While Holbraad 
suggests that indubitable truth may be a quintessential element of Western traditions 
of thought, it is more specifically the holy grail of the rationalist tradition –think of 
Descartes’s method of doubt– in relation to which Kant produced his epistemological 
revolution. After the Kantian reconciliation, the idea of indubitable truth becomes 
more like a chimera whose very possibility of achievement is itself foreclosed by the 
unavoidable problem of how one comes to know anything. If, as argued in the 
previous section, knowledge in this sense is but the correlation between reality and 
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human minds or cultures, truth can only ever be ‘doubtful’, that is, open, at least in 
principle, to doubt, to probability, to the conservation of the conditions under which a 
truth-claim is made, to the possibility of error. Truth is always subject, in other words, 
to the fundamental dependence by what is known, on who/what knows it. Indeed, once 
inside the epistemological game, only knowledge –i.e. representations of a fact– can 
be either true or false, and this knowledge is never the mere reflection of the fact, but 
always the outcome of the active interpretation, by a knowing subject, of an object 
known. 
 How to take divinatory practices seriously, then? As I have shown, traversing 
the epistemological abyss, claiming that Ifá diviners have a different way of knowing 
the truth, will not do. What is needed, therefore, is not so much an epistemological 
reconstruction but an inquiry that allows us to imagine an entirely different relation 
between knowledge and reality such that Ifá’s concept of truth may not just ‘make 
sense’, but may become transformative of how truth is conceived in the West too. 
What is required, in other words, is an inquiry that can grapple directly with the 
ontology of truth, that is, with the question of what divinatory truth is and how it 
operates in such practices.  
 Holbraad’s study constitutes just such an inquiry. Although I cannot possibly 
do justice to the sophistication of his ethnographic exploration within the bounds of 
this paper, by engaging with divinatory consultations as well as initiation rituals, and 
indeed with the entire cosmology of Ifá, Holbraad (2012: 203-205) argues that 
divinatory truth is something other than a representation, grounded as the latter is on 
the immutable distinction between subject and object. By contrast, divinatory truth 
emerges as the diviner succeeds in practice in bringing together different, dynamic 
paths of existence and meaning –e.g. the mythical path of Ifá gods, the meaning 
emerging of the manipulation of the material powders and paraphernalia during the 
consultation, and the personal path of the consultant– such that a metamorphosis of all 
such trajectories is produced. As Holbraad (2012: 207) puts it,  
 
at issue here is not the veracity of the way things are thought 
about or represented, but rather the capability that things –
moving, motile things– have to reveal themselves in particular 
ways, when they come into relation with each other: the affect 
of proximal motion. Indeed, this should not be read merely as 
a metaphor, since “things” in this context does not refer (only) 
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to objects or entities, but more broadly to all meaningful data 
that, as such, register, and can interact, in motion and as 
motion […]. 
 
Rather than as truth-as-representation, which in order to verify itself requires both the 
claim and the object of representation to remain static, divinatory truth has a ‘motile’ 
ontology– it takes hold by way of the practical movements effected by the diviner that 
transform diverse paths of existence and meaning. They constitute verdicts whose task 
is not to conform to ready-given facts, but to connect Ifá myths with the circumstances 
of the consultant in relevant ways, and in so doing transform different trajectories of 
meaning. Confronted with such verdicts, the consultant may be bewildered by them, 
even distressed. Indeed, such may be the appropriate response to the diviner’s failure 
to make a relevant connection between the myths and the personal circumstances of 
the consultant. But given that divinatory truths are not a matter of representation but 
one of transformation, such bewilderment is never a ‘question of belief’ or disbelief in 
the verdict (Holbraad, 2012: 204). Divinatory truths, in other words, do not exist in 
relation to a given state of affairs against which they can be ‘doubted’. They come into 
existence in and through motion, and their task is to set meaningful things (including 
the consultant’s life-history and future) in motion. Indeed, belief has nothing to do 
with it. Divinatory truths are ‘indubitable’, then, because ‘doubt’ –which presupposes 
representation– is irrelevant to them. 
 Holbraad’s study enables us to draw out some important implications of a 
possible alliance between anthropology and sociology for a decolonial imagination. 
The first is simple, and it is that just as other realities –and not just other 
epistemologies– are possible, some of these anthropological studies show that forms 
of social inquiry that risk imagining the end of epistemology, with its fundamentally 
representational understanding of knowledge, are possible too.  Pace the Kantian 
tradition, we are not trapped in epistemology. Thus, if ‘the very separation of 
sociology and anthropology has facilitated sociology’s self-understanding as brought 
about in the European production of modernity distinct from its colonial 
entanglements’ (Bhambra 2014: 2), my sense is that an alliance with such forms of 
anthropological inquiry is now crucial for sociology to imagine the end of 
epistemology without end, and to begin to cultivate a decolonial imagination. 
  Second, in taking this imaginative leap of thinking beyond epistemology, a 
recursive implication takes effect– one that affects what we take anthropology and 
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sociology themselves to be. Indeed, Holbraad’s ethnography is no longer put at the 
service of ‘applying’ or confirming the Western concepts of a modern discipline 
outside the West, nor is his analysis performed with the purpose of interrogating the 
‘epistemological’ assumptions that anthropologists and natives make when they 
attempt to know practices from the South. By seeking to think from the difference that 
other practices make, anthropology, and the social sciences more generally, become 
practices oriented to the construction of ‘the conditions for the conceptual, I mean 
ontological, self-determination of people’ (Viverios de Castro, 2003) by affirming, 
enlarging, and making resonate, the many realities of which the world is made. 
 Unlike the first two, the second set of implications one can draw from the ‘turn 
to ontology’ in anthropology are, in my view, negative ones– rather than provide 
direct paths for inquiry, they might teach us to be vigilant of some of the dangers 
involved. The first is that the concept of ‘ontology’ is not itself unequivocal. While an 
invitation to attend to the ontological in social and cultural practices can be a 
provocation to traverse the colonial abyss, this needs not be the case. If ontology is 
defined, for example, as ‘theories of being and reality’ (Carrithers et al., 2010: 154); if 
the question is ‘how do others think about reality?’ instead of ‘what realities do others 
inhabit and how do they enable others to think?’, then ontology becomes another word 
for culture –or indeed, another word for epistemology– and the so-called ‘turn to 
ontology’, which claims to be concerned with differences between worlds rather than 
worldviews, starts to resemble something closer to the study of differences between 
worldly worldviews.  
 While I do not think that either Viveiros de Castro or Holbraad fall into such a 
trap, the concern by some anthropologists that this may be more generally the case is 
in my view a legitimate one (Carrithers et al., 2010). And it is expounded by the 
holism that still pervades much anthropological thinking– namely, the tendency to 
speak of ‘ontologies’ precisely as one would do of ‘cultures’, as a matter of ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’, of a ‘northern’ and a ‘southern’ ontology, and so on. Thus, rather than 
propose that sociology take its own ‘turn to ontology’, I am suggesting that what is at 
stake in some of these ethnographies is the cultivation of a new form of realism, an 
alter-realism, for which the very distinction between epistemology and ontology 
becomes obsolete. A realism that takes the risk of asserting the reality of what is 
deemed improbable, implausible, marginalised, suppressed, irrelevant, even 
scandalous, and seeks to draw out its possible implications for the transformation of 
what is considered credible, reliable, and serious (Savransky, 2016). What would 
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become of the (social) sciences were they to take seriously a form of truth that seeks 
not to represent reality but to set realities in motion?   
  Finally, there is a political implication that is crucial for how sociology might 
engage in such forms of realism. Although for Viveiros de Castro (2003) the 
ontological turn requires that we refrain from thinking ‘each culture and society as the 
embodiment of a specific solution to a generic problem’, and that we acknowledge 
that ‘the problems themselves are radically distinct’, in the case of many 
anthropological studies the exercise of creating the conditions for the ontological self-
determination of people is performed with ‘peoples’ for whom ontological self-
determination is not necessarily a problem that demands development. In this sense, a 
sociological project of ‘rearguard’ theoretical constructions, that is, of thinking with 
and after the social and political struggles such as the World Social Forum, the buen 
vivir movement, and other alter-globalisation, feminist, migration and radical 
ecological movements, may perhaps serve as an important antidote to this threat. For 
what is at stake is not just ‘peoples’ in general, but the construction of theoretical tools 
for the self-determination of the realities of countermovements and collectives that are 
already involved in social and political struggles for existential justice. Struggles for a 
politics of reality that seeks to ‘establish forms of life that are simultaneously the 
effect and the precondition for the continuation of existence of marginalized actors.’ 
(Papadopoulos, 2010: 193). A decolonial, sociological imagination, thus, is one 
concerned with affirming not only the realities of others, but the realities of others for 
whom reality itself is in the making, for whom the cry ‘another world is possible!’ can 
never be reduced to a simple metaphor. 
 
Conclusion: The Politics of Reality 
 
 Challenging the assumption that epistemology constitutes the proper horizon 
for the transformative potential that postcolonial and decolonial thought hold for 
sociology, I have argued that what is at stake is the cultivation of an imagination that 
can move beyond the concern with how others come to ‘know’ the world, and can 
affirm the reality of movements and collectives for whom the possibility of another 
world matters. The task therefore is to take seriously, and to think with, the differences 
that these movements have made, and still endeavour to make, in their attempts to 
actualise the possibilities of another world. To take their struggles seriously is to risk 
becoming realists again, but not without transforming the stakes of realism itself. It is 
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to exercise new decolonial, plural, alter-realisms that enable us to affirm not only the 
reality of the ‘West’ –were such a thing to exist– but also other realities in the making. 
A realism for which ‘reality’ is, first and foremost, an ethical and political problem.  
 As I advanced in the introduction, despite his overarching concern with 
epistemology, I think Santos’s concept of the sociology of absences and emergences 
may prove fertile as a starting point for such a task5. We might now be in a position to 
see why. The reason is that it is in the articulation of this form of sociology that Santos 
is at his most realist. It is in relation to this proposal that reality itself, and not only 
epistemology, becomes a political problem. As he puts it,  
 
reality cannot be reduced to what exists because what exists is 
the only visible part of reality that modern abyssal thinking 
defines as being on this side of the line and within whose 
confines it elaborates its theories […]. Beyond that line, […] 
there is nothing of relevance, and it can therefore be easily 
dismissed or made invisible or irrelevant [or be] produced as 
nonexistent. The sociology of absences is the inquiry into the 
workings of this abyssal line in our time. (Santos 2014: 172) 
 
Crucially, to speak of the modern ‘production of nonexistence’ is not the same as 
asserting the actual destruction of such alternatives by the established Western 
régimes of existence. To do so would situate us right back in the colonial abyss, where 
what we can know can determine what can exist, and where absence of knowledge is 
equated with nothingness. But absence is not nothingness. No matter how efficacious 
Modernity may have been in expelling these other existents and their realities off the 
realm of what is considered plausible, credible, reasonable or even relevant, these 
nevertheless matter, and they exist ‘as meteorites hovering the space of order’ (Santos 
2014: 171), demanding countermovements to turn them into productive resources for 
the activation of a politics of reality. 
  For this reason, the other side of the sociology of absences is a ‘sociology of 
emergences’, whose task is that of populating the future with ‘plural and concrete 
possibilities, utopian and realist at one and the same time and constructed in the 
present by means of activities of care.’ (Santos, 2014: 182). A decolonial, sociological 
project concerned with the politics of reality must therefore cultivate a speculative, 
pluralist, alter-realism that risks thinking and acting on what is not-yet, on realities to 
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be constructed, on futures to be attained. In this way, the possibility of a global 
sociology, which is to say, of a post-abyssal form of social thought and practice, 
demands a new kind of imagination, one that allows us to speculatively conceive and 
to politically affirm ‘the South as if there were no North, […] woman as if there were 
no man, […] the slave as if there were no master’ (Santos 2014: 171)– and reality as if 
there were no epistemology. In order to begin to cultivate such a decolonial 
imagination, we need to risk thinking from the difference that the realities of the South 
can make, and to put sociology at the service of a politics of reality brought about by 
such collectives. Whatever ‘sociology’ becomes in the course of such a task will 
always remain an open question, for as I have shown, we never ‘know’ what thinking 
from the South can do to sociology. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 My use of the term ‘sociology’ here is, to be sure, metonymic. Given sociology’s internal 
heterogeneity, this is no minor point. What I am referring to are those influential traditions of 
sociological thinking and knowledge-making that have shaped what one may associate with 
the mainstream of the discipline, while momentarily excluding the intense, if comparatively 
marginal, zones of exchange between sociology and cultural studies (on this issue see 
McLennan, 2006).   
2 The other being modern law which, unfortunately, I cannot analyse here in any detail (but 
see Santos, 2002). 
3 That is, the difference between 'the objectively valid’ and the ‘merely subjective’. (Daston & 
Galison, 2007: 207). 
4 And not because they ‘can’t’, or because they be backward, but because they do not 
participate in the problem that modern thought has created for knowledge.  
5 Provided that we do not ground it in an ‘epistemology of absences’ (Santos, 2014: 157) 
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